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WAYNE SHIRLEY*

Application of National Association of

Regulatory Utility Commissioners
Principles to Guide the Restructuring
of the Electric Industry to Issues of
Bypass*
At its summer committee meetings in Los Angeles, on July 25,1996,
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners adopted its
"NARUC Principles to Guide the Restructuring of the Electric Industry."
The NARUC Principles are set forth as a general principle followed by 10
specific principles. Each principle has a primary statement which is
followed by a short explanatory statement. Although not written to
specifically address issues related to bypass, public policy choices relating
to bypass, as well as all other policies implicated by restructuring of the
electric industry, should be analyzed in light of these principles. Each of
these principles is presented below with commentary on their relationship
to bypass issues.
GENERAL PRINCIPLE
Consumers should have access to adequate, safe, reliable, and
efficient energy services at fair and reasonable prices at the lowest longterm cost to society.
Structural changes in the industry should be encouraged when they
result in improved economic efficiency' and serve the broader public
Chairman, New Mexico Public Utility Commission. B.B.A. University of Texas, 1973;
J.D. Southern Methodist University, 1976.
** Adaptation of remarks presented at the University of New Mexico School of Law
Symposium on Electric Industry Bypass Policy.
1. The NARUC Principles include the following footnote relative to economic efficiency:
By economic efficiency we mean efficiency in the production and onsumption
of goods and services. Societal welfare is improved as economic efficiency is
increased, which is to say that scarce resources are put to their most highly
valued uses and are used most efficiently in production. There are several
components of economic efficiency: (a) allocative efficiency (when society's
resources have been organized for productive purposes in such a way that it
would be impossible to reorganize them to benefit one part without making
*

another part worse off); (b)productive eff-ciency (a given quantity of output
is produced at the lowest possible total cost); and (c) other production
efficiencies (associated with management of the production process).
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interest. This principle should remain the goal for all restructuring
proposals. Many of the specific principles listed below will be in tension
and will require balancing in light of this principle.
Ideally, decisions to bypass the incumbent utility system should be
made in light of this general principle. The key provision of this principle
regarding bypass is the provision relating to improved economic efficiency
and service of the broader public interest. From a state regulator's
viewpoint, bypass in violation of this principle should be discouraged.
Nonetheless, sorting out actual proposed bypass decisions is not a simple
matter. Traditional regulation is founded on the notion of natural monopoly, which is, in turn, embodied in the notion of allocative efficiency set
forth in the footnote. This definition may be in direct conflict with the
concept of dynamic efficiency. Indeed, it is this conflict which has, in many
ways, driven the current restructuring of the industry.
This analysis is further complicated by distortions in pricing
brought about by the regulatory process itself. This distortion occurs in two
ways. First, regulators may make certain policy choices which knowingly
distort prices to achieve specific policy goals. For example, Demand Side
Management and renewable technology development may be furthered
through price adders. The other distortion comes from rate design which is
clearly as much art as science and which necessarily has some noise or
distortion in its result.
Distortion caused by rate design may be further aggravated by a
policy of assuring recovery of all costs (as opposed to preserving an "opportunity" to recover those costs). When a customer leaves the system in an act
of bypass or otherwise, if the lost revenues are reallocated to other
customers, the concept of allocative efficiency seems to be put in play. Full
cost recovery is not assured in a competitive market. Thus, reallocation of
revenues to a dwindling customer base (i.e. raising the price) creates a result
contrary to competitive market principles which would lower prices. This
traditional regulatory paradox is the single most complicating factor in
addressing bypass issues.

Furthermore, this notion of efficiency is not merely static efficiency, but also
includes dynamic efficiencies (such as innovation and technological development) that arise over time from the stimulus of competition in an
environment in flux.
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PRINCIPLE I: NETWORK INTEGRITY
The safety, reliability, quality, and sustainability of electric
service should be maintained or improved in a restructured electric
industry. Market-based decisions, driven by economics and competition
alone, could jeopardize critical safety and reliability and long-term
strategic resource and facilities planning. Public policy should ensure the
integrity of the electric grid and encourage prudent long-term resource
planning, acquisition, and utilization.
While bypass, in and of itself, is unlikely to directly impact network
integrity,2 it should, nonetheless meet this litmus test before being
embraced. Bypass will most likely impact long-term resource planning,
acquisition and utilization, especially when associated with dynamic
efficiency. Therefore, care should be taken to avoid creating uneconomic
incentives which run counter to these long-term issues. This may occur
under traditional "fixed revenue" regulation, discussed above. For
customers who elect to bypass, but continue to need some services from the
system, regulators should assure that those services are fairly priced and do
not lead to system modifications which are paid for by non-bypass
customers.
PRINCIPLE II: UNIVERSAL SERVICE
Universal Service at reasonable rates, including adequate
protections for low-income customers, should be maintained. Because
electricity service is vital for health, safety, and economic opportunity,
universal service is a cornerstone of the public interest. Customers are
entitled to access to reasonably priced power, and to a forum for dispute
resolution.
In some circumstances, bypass may further the principle of
universal service. For example, there may be situations in which the most
economic way to extend service to those who currently have no service is
to bypass the system through on-site generation options. This choice meets
the tenets of this principle, the NARUC General Principle and its
underpinnings of economic efficiency. However, where the effects of bypass
by existing customers are allowed to be passed on to a utility's remaining
customers, low-income customers are likely to be impacted the most.
Accordingly, policy makers should assure that this type of residual cost

2. Bypass should not impair the operation of the existing system.
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recovery is discouraged or, where allowed, that this principle is not
undermined.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's [Hereinafter FERC]
approach to this issue, in its Order 888, is to create a "non-bypassable"
stranded cost charge. Such charges are "non-bypassable" only so long as the
customer remains on the system in some manner. Insofar as recovery of
stranded costs is appropriate, there is nothing inherently wrong with the
FERC approach. 3 However, when such charges force complete bypass,
there is no mechanism for recovery of these costs. In such a case, if
uncollectible charges are reallocated to remaining customers, then Principle II is violated. Accordingly, regulators should be vigilant in addressing
the impact of these events on low-income customers.
The direct effects of competition should not be viewed as violative
of Principle II. Where a customer (low-income or otherwise) is given a
power supply choice and ends up paying more than he would have paid by
choosing an alternative, it is not the role of regulation to protect the
customer from the effects of that choice. Indeed, assuming a viable market
with an absence of market power, the market should, by definition, provide
reasonable prices. Subsidies to low-income customers utilized by regulators
or legislators should be explicit in order to keep the quality of information
at its highest.
Consistent with the final statement of Principle II, customers must
be provided a forum for dispute resolution. At a policy level, the courts
arguably provide such a forum. However, due to the expertise needed to
fully understand the market, state commissions will likely continue to
provide some sort of consumer protection function.
PRINCIPLE III: CUSTOMER CHOICE
Customers should have the opportunity to make informed
choices among electricity providers and services. The potential for
competition to improve economic efficiency rests on having multiple
service providers as well as informed consumers. Market development
should be guided in a way that increases the role of competition among
energy service providers and the role of choice for consumers.
Standing alone, Principle III is the strongest principle in support of
individual customer bypass decisions. The concepts of informed choice and

3. This statement is intended to express agreement with the cost recovery mechanism
used by the FERC for true wholesale stranded costs and does not include the FERC's "retailturned-wholesale" policy which may infringe on state authority and policy.
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economic efficiency are critical to the issue of bypass. Where both the
informed choice and economic efficiency tests are met, bypass may be
appropriate. Where there are no non-explicit regulatory policies or market
structures which distort the customer's decision-making, customer choice
provides the single greatest force in driving the market toward economic
choices.
Municipal bypass decisions may serve to undermine this principle
where the municipality does not offer direct customer choice, but chooses
instead to interject its own choices by functioning as an aggregator for its
customers or as a vertically integrated utility. However, municipal bypass
may be as much a political decision as a policy decision. Thus, it carries an
underlying state policy determination through the empowerment of the
municipality to make that choice. Nonetheless, care should be taken to
avoid policies which distort the economic signals presented to municipal
decision-makers. Municipal utilities should be encouraged to provide open
access systems to their customers, as opposed to serving as a surrogate
aggregator.
PRINCIPLE IV: CONSUMER PROTECTION
Consumers should be protected from anti-competitive behavior,
undue discrimination, poor service, and unfair billing and disconnection
practices. Regulatory processes should continue where effective
competition is absent and where monopolies and other forms of market
power remain. Market power concerns are particularly relevant when
considering electric utility mergers and acquisitions.
Actions taken to prevent bypass and in response to bypass, may
violate Principle IV. For example, under many traditional approaches to
regulation, utilities are allowed to offer discriminatory "load retention
rates" to keep customers from leaving the system. In a competitive environment, such rates are only appropriate, if residual costs (or lost revenues) are
not passed on to remaining customers. The same issue regarding load
retention rates is present after a customer has elected to bypass.
The reallocation of such costs to remaining customers is an attribute
of the market power of the company and should be guarded against. Where
market power exists, the discriminatory effect of selective pricing likely
outweighs the "benefits" of retaining the customer on the system. These
issues are particularly aggravated in situations where a single entity or
family of companies provide both competitive and monopoly services.
Regulators must be vigilant in protecting consumers from undue
discrimination hiding behind the veil of "competition."
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PRINCIPLE V: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Industry restructuring policies should be developed in public
processes with participation open to all. All stakeholders should receive
fair consideration in public processes.
This principle is not directly invoked by any bypass issues.
However, care should be taken to assure that all participants who may be
involved in bypass decisions are allowed an opportunity to participate in
the restructuring debate. This is true regardless of whether the forum is
private or public, legislative or regulatory. Exclusion of stakeholders may
result in uninformed bypass decisions.
PRINCIPLE VI: SHARED BENEFITS
All classes of customers should benefit from improvements due
to structural changes in the industry. Electric industry restructuring
should be done in a way that benefits all customer classes fairly and does
not unduly disadvantage any customer class nor preserve any undue
cross-class subsidy.
As services are unbundled and bypass decisions occur, crosssubsidies embedded in current rates will become more apparent. While
elimination of these subsidies will benefit the classes and customers who
have been subsidizing others, the subsidized class may view this as a
detriment of restructuring. Techniques of gradualism, used by many state
commissions, may not be available to ease the impact of this phenomenon.
Access to market-based prices, however, should mitigate the problem.
Therefore, as regulators attempt to address this essentially political issue,
they should seek to prevent pricing signals which could induce uneconomic
bypass.
Assuming the mitigation of distortions which might encourage
uneconomic bypass, policy-makers must assure that the market is
restructured for all customers. Bypass choices will then be presented to all
customers, although the economics of those choices may vary by customer
or by class. While the economics on paper might argue for a residential
bypass choice, the transaction costs of exercising that choice might
overwhelm the savings which the customer perceives. Thus, it is critical that
transaction costs be appropriately priced and not be used as a tool to
undermine economic bypass.
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PRINCIPLE VII: PUBLIC BENEFITS
The public benefits of energy efficiency, renewable resource
technologies, and research and development should be maintained
through existing or new mechanisms. Energy efficiency, renewable

resource technologies and research and development provide significant
economic and other benefits for the nation and are critical to achieving
a long-term, sustainable, and efficient electricity future.
In the last two decades, regulators have used varying levels of
affirmative policies to encourage energy efficiency, renewable resource

technologies and research and development. Demand Side Management,
market information and market transformation programs have also

significantly impacted the industry. The current challenge to policy makers
is to assure that the long-term benefits of these programs are identified and
included in the economic reality of the market place. Many of these areas
represent direct bypass of the system.
In some cases, bypass may actually further this principle, by
reaching niche markets which an "exclusive territory" policy might exclude.
This may occur with respect to both energy efficiency and renewable
technologies. To the extent that state commissions make policy choices
encouraging energy efficiency and renewable technologies through
traditional or other mechanisms (e.g. wires charges), bypass could serve to
undermine those policy choices. If such revenue sources are seriously
undermined, the long-term social benefits of such technologies would be
deferred, if not lost.
Because the market tends to focus on short-term economics, policymakers must keep an eye on the long-term issues facing society and assure
that the market is kept on track to achieve the long-term objectives stated
in this principle. Indeed, it may be that the long-term results will produce
a complete bypass of the system through distributed, renewable technology.
The benefits to be achieved from this "end state," however, should not be
lost in the process of restructuring the industry.
PRINCIPLE VIII: ENVIRONMENT
Structural changes to the electric industry should maintain or
improve the quality of the environment. The electric industry affects the
environment, and environmental protection continues to be a high
priority for society. The environmental benefits and costs of different
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generation, delivery, and service options should be recognized through
market mechanisms, where they are effective, or by regulation.
Bypass choices may not be consistent with broader environmental
policies currently followed by state commissions which may be driven
solely by customer perceived economics. As a result, state commissions
should have a heightened concern over the environmental impact of bypass
and should seek to assure that bypass decisions do not undermine
environmental policies.
Policy-makers should also attempt to capture externalities in
resource choices through market-based mechanisms. Traditional regulation
has provided a partial, if imperfect, forum for addressing this issue.
However, the problem becomes more difficult in a competitive
environment. New mechanisms must be designed to address this issue. This
is particularly evident in bypass choices, where consumers elect "cheaper"
but "dirtier" supplies which bypass the system. In the bypass scenario,
many of these issues will be beyond the reach of state commissions and
environmental regulators will be required to address this problem.
PRINCIPLE IX: STRANDED COSTS
Existing commitments of utilities arising from past decisions
made pursuant to historical regulatory and legal principles should be
addressed in a fair and reasonable manner by states. Claims to recover
net, verifiable, and non-mitigatable costs potentially "stranded" in a
restructured market should be decided by states.
Regardless of the propriety of allowing the recovery of stranded
costs, when recovery is allowed, bypass decisions are implicated in two
ways. First, because stranded cost recovery reduces the economic benefits
of competition in the non-bypass regime, it places great pressure on
decision-makers to choose bypass where such a choice can avoid cost
recovery. Thus, to the extent stranded costs may be bypassed, there is a
built in distortion in pricing favoring bypass.
Second, where bypass successfully avoids stranded cost recovery,
the pool of stranded costs grows relative to remaining customers, or must
be borne by the utility. Thus, this principle may be in conflict with most of
the other principles. Providing a fair mechanism to recover appropriate
stranded costs, without incurring unintended consequences, is a significant
challenge facing regulators in restructuring.
It remains to be seen how tolerant a competitive market will be for
stranded cost recovery schemes. Even where the principle stakeholders
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agree that such cost may be recovered, the distortions in pricing that such
recoveries present to the consumer may force suppliers to compromise
recovery of stranded cost in order to avoid loss of market share.
PRINCIPLE X: STATE RESPONSIBILITIES
States and state commissions should determine retail electric
policies, including restructuring policies. Restructuring should recognize
the unique characteristics of the various states. State legislatures and
state public utility commissions are most accountable to the people and
are closest to the people, problems, and opportunities that restructuring
will present at the retail level. Accordingly, the policy and
implementation decisions related to retail electric service should be
determined by the states.
Because state officials are closer to and more accessible by the
consuming public, state institutions should be the principle forums for retail
restructuring decisions, including decisions relating to bypass. Municipal
bypass decisions may be beyond the reach of state commissions and should
be addressed by legislatures and the courts with commission input or
guidance. Where municipalities are given unilateral control over such
decisions, remaining non-municipal customers should be protected from
those decisions by state policy-makers.
Regardless of form, bypass at the retail level is fundamentally a
state issue to be addressed by state legislatures, state commissions and
possibly other state agencies (e.g. environmental agencies). Some states may
adopt aggressive competition policies which make economic choices
transparent to consumers, thus accommodating economic bypass decisions.
Other states may attempt to be more protective of their incumbent utilities.
However, in the long run, market forces will tend to erode the differences
among the states and bring more uniformity to the market.

